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In report 6 of the BEPS action plan, Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances, the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposes (amongst others) to include a principal purpose test (PPT) in tax treaties. Under this test a treaty
benefit shall not be granted if it is reasonable to conclude that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or
transaction (subjective test), unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and
purpose of the relevant provisions of the treaty (objective test). The subjective test is, from the viewpoint of the tax authorities a relatively ‘easy’ test.
The objective test, however, can provide for some relief for taxpayers. In this article the PPT is being investigated and discussed. Especially, attention
is given to the objective test. An attempt is being made to develop practical guidance to interpret the PPT, based on Dutch case law and doctrine.
1 INTRODUCTION
Action item 6 of the BEPS project is about ‘Preventing
the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate
Circumstances’. The report on this topic, that was
published in October 2015 (hereafter: the report), contains
various proposals. In this article one of the proposals will
be investigated and discussed, namely the introduction of
a so-called ‘principal purpose test’ (PPT) in tax treaties.
This article is built up as follows. In section 2, the
meaning of the term ‘treaty abuse’ will be discussed. The
main characteristics of the PPT will be outlined in section
3. The PPT contains a subjective test (what was the aim of
the taxpayer using a certain arrangement?) and an
objective test (would granting the treaty benefit defeat the
‘object and purpose’ of the relevant treaty provision?).
These two tests will be investigated in sections 4 and 5.
This article will be concluded with a short summary in
section 6.1
2 TREATY ABUSE
In the report a distinction is made between two ways of
abuse under a tax treaty:
(1) The circumvention of provisions of the treaty itself.
(2) The circumvention of domestic law provisions.
An example of the first category is the use of conduit
companies. For example, an enterprise in country A wants
to invest in an enterprise in country B. However, there is
no tax treaty between country A and country B. There is,
however, a tax treaty between country B and country C,
but application of that treaty is restricted to residents of
country B and country C. The enterprise in country A tries
to circumvent that restriction by setting up a conduit
company in country C, and invests via that conduit
company in the enterprise in country B.
An example of the second category is trying to invoke a
tax treaty to avoid application of domestic CFC-provisions
or domestic thin capitalization legislation. Also not
applying the domestic abuse of law doctrine (fraus legis) in
an international (treaty) situation is a good example. For
example, the Dutch Supreme Court has ruled that certain
fact patterns that entirely took place in the Netherlands
could be challenged with the abuse of law doctrine, but
the same fact patterns, but now involving foreign (treaty
protected) companies, could not be challenged with the
abuse of law doctrine.2
Notes
* Prof. dr. Reinout Kok, Erasmus University Rotterdam and EY Amsterdam.
1 A Dutch version of this article, Enkele aspecten van de ‘principal purpose test’ (written on the basis of the draft report published in 2014) was published in WFR 2015/184.
2 The Dutch Supreme Court has ruled in HR 15 Dec. 1993, nr. 29 296, BNB 1994/259, annotation J.C.K.W. Bartel, HR 29 Jun. 1994, nr. 28 734, BNB 1994/294,
conclusion Advocate-General Verburg, annotation P.J. Wattel and HR 15 Mar. 1995, nr. 29 531, BNB 1995/150, annotation P.J. Wattel, that fraus legis could not be
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3 THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE TEST
3.1 The Proposed Article X(7)
In the report, the PPT is Article X(7) of the OECD Model
tax convention. The proposed Article X(7) reads as
follows:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this Convention, a
benefit under this Convention shall not be granted in respect of
an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude,
having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that
obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any
arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly
in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that
benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the
object and purpose of the relevant provisions of this Convention.
One can see two tests in order to determine whether the
benefit of the treaty should be granted in a specific case.
The first test is the subjective test. Was obtaining the
benefit one of the principal purposes of any arrangement
or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that
benefit? If this is the case, the treaty benefit will not be
granted, unless – and this is the objective test – granting
that benefit would be in accordance with the object and
purpose of the relevant treaty provision(s).
This is in line with the guiding principle of paragraph
9.5 of the Commentary on Article 1 of the OECD Model
Convention:
A guiding principle is that the benefits of a convention should
not be available where a main purpose for entering into certain
transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable
tax position and obtaining that more favourable treatment in
these circumstances would be contrary to the object and purpose
of the relevant provisions.
Article X(7) is the codification of the concept of ‘fraus
conventionis’ that is for example well known in Dutch
professional tax literature. A good definition of fraus
conventionis that can be found in Dutch doctrine is:
Acting in fraudem conventionis in tax law, is when a
taxpayer uses a scheme/transaction with the sole, of or at least,
essential purpose to obtain the desired tax consequences on the
basis of the relevant tax treaty, whilst that scheme/transaction
defeats the object and purpose of the treaty.3
If one compares this definition with the proposed
Article X(7), one can clearly recognize the similarities
regarding the two tests. There is, however, a relevant
difference in the subjective test. In Article X(7) the
subjective test is met if ‘one of the principal purposes’ is
obtaining the tax benefit, whilst under the definition of
fraus conventionis, that is only the case if the ‘sole or
essential purpose’ was obtaining the tax benefit. From the
viewpoint of the tax authorities the subjective test under
Article X(7) is therefore more ‘easy’. This will be discussed
in more detail hereunder.
Another difference is the following. Article X(7) is
structured in a different way than the definition of fraus
conventionis that was given above. In Article X(7), the
main rule is the subjective test. If the principal purpose of
an arrangement/transaction is obtaining the treaty benefit,
the PPT applies. The objective test (object and purpose of
a treaty) is only an exception to the main rule. Under fraus
conventionis the subjective and objective test are equally
important, i.e., they are not modelled as a main rule and
an exception. This difference between the PPT and fraus
conventionis could result in different outcomes in practice.
Sometimes it might be difficult to determine what
the object and purpose of a treaty and/or treaty provisions
are. In such case, under the PPT, a taxpayer cannot use the
objective test in order to safeguard the benefits of the
treaty, because in order to invoke that exception it has to
be established that granting the benefit would be in
accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant
treaty provision(s). In such case, applying fraus
conventionis – on the contrary – would likely be difficult.
As said, the concept of fraus conventionis has been
discussed in Dutch professional tax literature. It is
noteworthy that the Dutch Supreme Court, so far, has not
applied the concept of fraus conventionis. Reference can be
made to its decision of 11 May 2006.4 In this case, the
place of residence of a Dutch company was migrated to
Belgium just before the company went into liquidation.
Under the Belgium-Dutch treaty, this implied that the
liquidation proceeds (in the hands of the shareholder)
could not be taxed in the Netherlands. The Supreme
Court ruled that since the treaty referred to the place of
residence of a company for certain tax consequences, it
could not successfully be argued (by the tax authorities)
that migrating a company to Belgium to obtain those tax
benefits, would be against the object and purpose of the
tax treaty. It is, however, not fully clear whether the
Supreme Court denied application of the concept of fraus
conventionis only in this specific case, or whether the
decision has a more general meaning, i.e., that fraus
Notes
applied in a treaty situation because neither from the text of the treaty itself, nor from the clarifications of the contracting states it could be derived that it was intended that
fraus legis could be applied under the treaty on the arrangements at hand.
3 Reference is made to the annex to the conclusions of Advocate-General Van Ballegooijen in the cases 39 223, 40 450, 40 451, 40 452 en 40 453. The annex can be found in
BNB 2007/36. The translation from Dutch into English is not verbatim.
4 HR 12 May 2006, nr. 39 223, BNB 2007/36, conclusion Advocate-General Van Ballegooijen, annotation S. van Weeghel. See also HR 14 Jul. 2006, nr. 42 522, BNB
2007/42, annotation S. van Weeghel.
The Principal Purpose Test in Tax Treaties under BEPS 6
407
conventionis will never be applied by the Dutch Supreme
Court.5
3.2 IsThere a Need for Article X(7)?
It is a fair question whether Article X(7) does change the
current practice of treaty application. Lang has argued that
treaty benefits should not be granted if taxpayers act
contrary to the object and purpose of a treaty.6 In his view
Article X(7) ‘does not have an independent legal
significance but merely underlines the already evident
need for interpretation to be based on the object and
purpose of the rules. Therefore, the rule is a mere hint for
the interpretation and totally expendable’. This line of
reasoning might be applicable in several jurisdictions,7
but as outlined above, in the Netherlands it is not clear
whether the concept of fraus conventionis can apply, and
even if it could be applicable in specific cases, the Dutch
Supreme Court probably will be very reluctant to apply it.
Also reference can be made to Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In that article
it is stated that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light
of its object and purpose’. In the author’s view, this is
merely a provision relating to the interpretation of
terminology of a treaty, but treaty abuse is not specifically
related to the interpretation of terminology.
3.3 What is a Treaty Benefit?
What exactly is meant by ‘a benefit under this
Convention’? Paragraph 7 of the draft Commentary on
Article X(7) states that this includes all limitations (e.g., a
tax reduction, exemption, deferral or refund) on taxation
imposed on the State of source under Articles 6–22 of the
Convention, the relief from double taxation provided by
Article 23, and the protection afforded to residents and
nationals of a Contracting State under Article 24 or any
other similar limitations.8
4 ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSES
4.1 When is the Test Met?
The tax benefit will not be granted ‘if it is reasonable to
conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and
circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the
principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction’.9
The words ‘reasonable to conclude’ are used so that a
taxpayer cannot avoid application of the PPT by merely
asserting that the arrangement or transaction was not
undertaken or arranged to obtain the benefits of the
Convention. According to the report (paragraph 6 of the
draft Commentary on Article X(7)), the determination
whether an arrangement or transaction was carried out
with the principal purpose of obtaining a treaty benefit
requires reasonableness, suggesting that the possibility of
different interpretations of the events must be objectively
considered.10
The fact that has been chosen for ‘one of the principal
purposes’ instead of e.g., for the ‘sole purpose’, the
‘essential purpose’ or ‘predominant purpose’, makes it
relatively easy for the tax authorities to establish that the
subjective test is met.11 This is of course a deliberate
decision of the OECD. In the author’s view, the OECD
should have chosen for one of the alternative tests, because
it is difficult to argue that a taxpayer is abusing a treaty if
he has two equally important motives to carry out a
transaction, one tax reason and one commercial reason.
Nevertheless, the PPT could apply, because in this
scenario the tax reason is one of the principal purposes.
4.2 One of the Principal Purposes . . . of
What?
The question in the heading of this paragraph seems easy
to answer. One can answer it just by referring to the
wording of Article X(7). It is about one of the principal
purposes of ‘any arrangement or transaction that resulted
directly or indirectly in [the treaty] benefit’.
In the report an example is given of an enterprise in
country R that wants to open a factory abroad. Three
Notes
5 S. van Weeghel in his annotation under BNB 2007/42 is of the opinion that the Supreme Court has not definitely rejected the application of fraus conventionis as such.
M. Tydeman-Yousef, ‘Fraus conventionis, quae est?’, WFR 2014/23 holds the same view. It should be noted that there is a difference between the application of fraus
conventionis and the application of the national concept of abuse of law (fraus legis) in treaty situations. Reference is made to s. 2 of this article.
6 Michael Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties, Tax Notes Intl. 655–664 (May 2014).
7 Reference is made to para. 9.3 of the Commentary on the OECD Model Convention: ‘Other States prefer to view some abuses as being abuses of the convention itself, as
opposed to abuses of domestic law. These States, however, then consider that a proper construction of tax conventions allows them to disregard abusive transactions, such as
those entered into with the view to obtaining unintended benefits under the provisions of these conventions. This interpretation results from the object and purpose of tax
conventions as well as the obligation to interpret them in good faith (see Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).’
8 For a more detailed discussion reference is made to Michael Lang, BEPS Action 6: Introducing an Antiabuse Rule in Tax Treaties, Tax Notes Intl. 655–664 (May 2014).
9 Unless granting that treaty benefit would be in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of the relevant treaty provision(s). See s. 5 of this article.
10 Reference can be made to HMRC’s GAAR Guidance, under C3.3. This guidance can be found on www.hmrc.gov.uk/avoidance/gaar-part-abc.pdf.
11 For a EU concept of abuse reference is made, for example, to the Cadbury Schweppes case. CJ EU 12 Sep. 2006, nr. C-196/04.
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locations for that factory are being considered. It is
decided to open the factory in country S because that is the
only country of the three countries that had been
considered, that has a (beneficial) tax treaty with country
R. For the subjective test of the PPT one has not to look
to the motive for choosing country S, but to the motive for
building a factory. The factory is clearly not built to obtain
treaty benefits, and therefore the PPT should not apply.
For completeness’ sake, it can also be noted that granting
treaty benefits in this scenario would also be in line with
the object and purpose of the treaty.
5 OBJECT AND PURPOSE
5.1 Meaning
The treaty benefit will not be denied if granting that
treaty benefit would be in line with the ‘object and
purpose’ of the relevant treaty provision(s). There is no
explicit reference to the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty
in general. In the author’s view, however, the ‘object and
purpose’ of a treaty provision has to be interpreted in light
of the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty in general.
A question is whether ‘object’ and ‘purpose’ are just
synonyms for each other. In literature one can distinguish
two views. Buffard and Zemanek,12 for example, show that
English and German writers treat the two terms as
synonyms, whilst French writers give different meanings
to the two terms. In practice, this seems not a very
important issue. In tax literature, ‘object’ and ‘purpose’
seem to be mentioned in one breath.13 So, if there would
be a difference in meaning, it does not seem to be of
practical relevance for the interpretation of Article X(7).
5.2 How to Find ‘Object and Purpose’
Where can the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty or a
provision of a treaty be found? The primary source for the
‘object and purpose’ of a treaty has to be found in the text
of the treaty itself.14 The text of the treaty comprises,
apart from – of course – all the treaty provisions, also the
title of the treaty and the preamble to the treaty.
It is therefore important to note that the OECD
proposes to amend the title of tax treaties, so that they will
read as follows:15
Convention between (State A) and (State B) for the
elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income
and on capital and the prevention of tax evasion and
avoidance.
It is also proposed that the following preamble will be
included in tax treaties:
(State A) and (State B), Desiring to further develop their
economic relationship and to enhance their co-operation in tax
matters, [i]ntending to conclude a Convention for the
elimination of double taxation with respect to taxes on income
and on capital without creating opportunities for non-taxation
or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance
(including through treaty-shopping arrangements aimed
at obtaining reliefs provided in this Convention for the
indirect benefit of residents of third States) [h]ave agreed as
follows:
How does this help us? Does this provide practical
guidance? Probably not a lot, so we have to look further.
‘Object and purpose’ of a treaty can also be derived from
the treaty provisions themselves. De Broe gives some
examples: allocation of taxing rights to the two
contracting states (Article 6–22 Model Convention),
preventing some forms of discrimination (Article 24
Model Convention), administrative co-operation of tax
authorities of the contracting states (Article 25 Model
Convention), solving tax conflicts (Article 26 Model
Convention), mutual assistance regarding the collection of
tax claims (Article 27 Model Convention).16
Also these examples do not give a lot of practical
guidance for determining whether granting a treaty
benefit is in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty
or a treaty provision. For example, the allocation of taxing
rights, in other words determining which state has to step
back, is intentionally limited by Article X(7) and it would
therefore be incorrect to use that argument to defeat the
meaning of Article X(7) if double taxation is avoided in an
abusive way.
Another way of finding the ‘object and purpose’ of a
treaty is to look at the Commentary on the Model
Convention. If countries have made no relevant
reservations to the Commentary on the Model Convention,
one can use the Commentary as a source for
determining the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty or a treaty
provision.17
Notes
12 Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 Austrian Rev. Intl & Eur. L., 311–343 (1998).
13 In his dissertation Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law 175 (IBFD 2004), also Frank Engelen does not distinguish between ‘object’ and ‘purpose’.
14 Frank Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law, 175 (IBFD 2004).
15 The current title is: ‘Convention between (State A) and (State B) with respect to taxes on income and on capital.’ A related footnote reads as follows: ‘States wishing to do so
may follow the widespread practice of including in the title a reference to either the avoidance of double taxation or to both the avoidance of double taxation and the
prevention of fiscal evasion.’
16 L. de Broe, International Tax Planning & Prevention of Abuse under Domestic Tax Law 288 (Tax Treaties & EC-Law, IBFD 2008).
17 David A. Ward et al., The Interpretation of Income Tax Treaties with Particular Reference to the Commentaries on the OECD Model, 34 (IBFD 2005).
The Principal Purpose Test in Tax Treaties under BEPS 6
409
The proposed paragraph 7 of the Commentary on Article 1
of the Model Convention18 reads as follows:
The principal purpose of double taxation conventions is to
promote, by eliminating international double taxation,
exchanges of goods and services, and the movement of capital
and persons. As confirmed in the preamble of the Convention,
it is also part of the purposes of tax conventions to prevent tax
avoidance and evasion.
Assuming that the Commentary indeed is relevant for
determining the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty or a treaty
provision, also the (draft) Commentary on Article X(7)
and the various examples it contains, is therefore relevant.
Those examples can give (some) practical guidance.
5.3 Practical Guidance for Determining
‘Object and Purpose’
In this paragraph an attempt is made to give practical
guidance to determine the ‘object and purpose’ of a tax
treaty (provision). This is done on the basis of case law of
the Dutch Supreme Court and Dutch professional tax
literature regarding the ‘object and purpose’ of the Dutch
domestic tax legislation.19
In the first place, one can think of the situation in
which the legislator has intentionally not covered a
specific situation/arrangement in the legislation. In such
case, the concept of abuse of law (fraus legis) cannot be
used to successfully challenge such situation/arrangement.
In a treaty context it would not be easy to use this
guideline, as it can be – due to lack of relevant
documentation – difficult to know whether a situation/
arrangement intentionally is not covered by a treaty.
In the second place, one can think of the situation that
the legislator has not introduced provisions in its domestic
legislation to counter very obvious tax avoidance
possibilities.20 This criterion can – to some extent – be
useful in the context of tax treaties. If a specific avoidance
arrangement is obvious (or already used by taxpayers) at
the moment the treaty is being negotiated, contracting
states should take that into account during their treaty
negotiations. If they don’t, that can be an argument that,
apparently, they are fine with it. But, this criterion has to
be used cautiously. Conduit situations, for example, are in
the report on Action 6, regarded as ‘abusive’. If there is no
special provision in the treaty combating conduit
companies, it can – in the author’s view – not
(automatically) successfully be argued that the use of
conduit companies is in line with the ‘object and purpose’
of the treaty.
In the third place, one can think of the use of
quantitative conditions in the treaty. If a treaty benefit is
only granted if, e.g., one enterprise holds an interest of at
least 25% in the other enterprise, it is in line with the
‘object and purpose’ of the treaty provision to grant the
treaty benefit if that 25%-test is met, even if the only
reason for establishing that 25%-shareholding is tax-
driven.21 In example E of the draft Commentary on Article
X(7) this approach is followed:
Example E: RCo is a company resident of State R and, for the
last 5 years, has held 24 per cent of the shares of company
SCo, a resident of State S. Following the entry-into-force of a
tax treaty between States R and S (Article 10 of which is
identical to Article 10 of this Model), RCo decides to increase
to 25 per cent its ownership of the shares of SCo. The facts and
circumstances reveal that the decision to acquire these
additional shares has been made primarily in order to obtain
the benefit of the lower rate of tax provided by Article 10(2)a)
of the treaty.
In that case, although one of the principal purposes for the
transaction through which the additional shares are acquired
is clearly to obtain the benefit of Article 10(2)a), paragraph
7 would not apply because it may be established that granting
that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with
the object and purpose of Article 10(2) a). That subparagraph
uses an arbitrary threshold of 25 per cent for the purposes of
determining which shareholders are entitled to the benefit of the
lower rate of tax on dividends and it is consistent with this
approach to grant the benefits of the subparagraph to a
taxpayer who genuinely increases its participation in a
company in order to satisfy this requirement.
But now let’s change the example a little. Let’s now
assume that to obtain the treaty benefit, the shareholding
of RCo in SCo is increased from 24% to 25% just one day
before the dividend is being distributed. Is granting the
treaty benefit (the lowered dividend withholding tax rate)
in such case in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of the
treaty? In the (current) Commentary on Article 10 of
the Model Convention, it is stated that in such situation
the lowered withholding tax rate should not be applied
and it is given in consideration to the contracting states to
include a specific provision for such situation in the treaty:
Notes
18 This is a minor revision to the current para. 7. In the report also other revisions are proposed to the Commentary on Art. 1 to better articulate the desire to combat abuse.
19 Reference is made to R.J. de Vries, Het civielrechtelijke leerstuk rechtsverwerking in de fiscale jurisprudentie van de Hoge Raad, in Kwaliteit van belastingrechtspraak belicht, 219–229
(liber amicorum A.O. Lubbers, Sdu Uitgevers 2013), and his annotation under Supreme Court 13 Nov. 2009, nr. 08/01904, BNB 2010/24 conclusion Advocate-General
Wattel.
20 It has to be noted that it is not clear whether this criterion indeed can be used in the domestic (Dutch) context. Reference is made to the Supreme Court decision of 15 Mar.
2013, nr. 11/05609, BNB 2013/151, conclusion Advocate-General Wattel, annotation J.C. van Straaten.
21 Compare, in the Dutch domestic context, the decisions of the Supreme Court of 11 May 1988, nr. 24 918, BNB 1988/289, annotation Van Brunschot and 8 Jul. 1992, nr.
28 211, annotation Van Dijck.
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‘provided that this holding was not acquired primarily for
the purpose of taking advantage of this provision’. In the
report it is stated that to counter such abuse, a minimum
holding period should be provided for in the treaty.
Absent such minimum holding period, contracting states
can – in the author’s view – not invoke Article X(7) to
deny the treaty benefit in such a case.
In the fourth place one can think of the fundamental
features of a tax system. For example, in the Dutch
corporate income tax act (like in almost every other
country) a distinction is made between equity financing
and debt financing. Making use of this difference is not
against the ‘object and purpose’ of the tax legislation.22
This criterion can also be used in the treaty context. If
taxpayers decide to finance a foreign enterprise with
equity instead of with debt, because the withholding tax
rate on dividends in the relevant treaty is lower than the
withholding tax rate on interest, granting the treaty
benefit (applying the lower dividend withholding tax
rate), is in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty.
This does not mean, however, that artificially converting a
dividend into, e.g., a capital gain, cannot be challenged by
the principal purpose test.23
In the author’s view, taxation based on the residence of a
company is a fundamental feature of (international) tax
law. Migrating a company to obtain (improved) treaty
protection, should therefore not be regarded as contrary to
the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty. Reference can be made
to the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court of 12 May
2006, as mentioned in paragraph 3.1 above.24 On page 58
of the report the following situation is discussed:
The reference to ‘one of the principal purposes’ in paragraph 7
means that obtaining the benefit under a tax convention need
not be the sole or dominant purpose of a particular
arrangement or transaction. It is sufficient that at least one of
the principal purposes was to obtain the benefit. For example, a
person may sell a property for various reasons, but if before the
sale, that person becomes a resident of one of the Contracting
States and one of the principal purposes for doing so is to
obtain a benefit under a tax convention, paragraph 7 could
apply notwithstanding the fact that there may also be other
principal purposes for changing the residence, such as
facilitating the sale of the property or the re-investment of the
proceeds of the alienation.
This example seems to indicate that moving residence
can be challenged on the basis of Article X(7). This
example, however, (only) deals with the motive of the
taxpayer to move its residence, and does not deal with the
question whether granting the treaty benefit would be in
line with the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty. It is noted,
for completeness’ sake, that in the report it is proposed to
determine the treaty residence of a company no longer on
the basis of the tie-breaker rule (where is the effective
management situated), but on the basis of a mutual
agreement procedure. In light also of the above, it can be
argued that if countries chose to stick to the traditional
tie-breaker rule, they cannot successfully challenge the
move of residence of a company by invoking Article X(7).
To conclude this paragraph, hereunder also some
arguments will be discussed that (probably) cannot
successfully be invoked to argue that granting treaty
benefits would be in line with the ‘object and purpose’ of
the treaty (provision).
As already outlined in paragraph 5.2 one cannot simply
use the argument that the ‘object and purpose’ of a treaty
(provision) is to determine that a country cannot effectuate
its taxing rights (it has to step back). This argument
would defeat the entire meaning of Article X(7). The same
applies to the argument that treaties want to stimulate the
global trade and lowering the tax burden (even by using
abusive arrangements) would be positive for the global
trade.
Also the argument that contracting states forfeit their
right to invoke Article X(7) if they do not renegotiate
their treaty if a new form of abuse is detected, is weak.
Treaty negotiations are slow and time consuming and it
cannot be expected from the contracting states that each
time a new form of abuse pops up, the treaty is (promptly)
renegotiated.25 The same applies if the abusive
arrangement/transaction is not yet applied in practice, but
on a theoretical level is being described in professional tax
literature after the treaty entered into force.26
Also the fact that a limitation on benefits clause is
included in a treaty does not mean that Article X(7) can
no longer be applied. The argument would be that if one
meets the (stringent) limitation on benefits conditions,
which also have the avoidance of abuse as a background,
getting treaty benefits would be in line with the ‘object
and purpose’ of the treaty. In other words, the argument
would be that the ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty is to
grant treaty benefits to companies that meet the
(stringent) limitation on benefit provisions. This line of
argumentation is incorrect. Reference is made to the
following paragraph of the draft Commentary on Article
X(7) in the report:
Notes
22 Reference is made to the decision of the Supreme Court of 7 Feb. 2014, nr. 12/03540, BNB 2014/79, conclusion Advocate-General Wattel, annotation R.J. de Vries.
23 See s. 54 of the report.
24 Decision of 12 May 2006, nr. 39 223, BNB 2007/36, conclusion Advocate-General Van Ballegooijen, annotation S. van Weeghel.
25 Reference is made to the decision (under Dutch domestic tax legislation) of the Supreme Court of 10 Jul. 2009, nr. 43 363, BNB 2009/237, annotation J.C. van Straaten.
26 Reference is made to the decision (under Dutch domestic legislation) of the Supreme Court of 13 Nov. 2009, nr. 08/01904, BNB 2010/24, conclusion Advocate-General
Wattel, annotation R.J. de Vries.
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Conversely, the fact that a person is entitled to benefits under
paragraphs 1 to 6 does not mean that these benefits cannot be
denied under paragraph 7. Paragraphs 1 to 6 are rules that
focus primarily on the legal nature, ownership in, and general
activities of, residents of a Contracting State. As illustrated by
the example in the next paragraph, these rules do not imply
that a transaction or arrangement entered into by such a
resident cannot constitute an improper use of a treaty
provision.27
The same applies to stringent beneficial ownership
provisions. One cannot successfully argue that meeting the
(stringent) beneficial ownership provision implies that
getting treaty benefits would be in line with the object
and purpose of the treaty. Reference is made to paragraph
12.5 of the (current) Commentary on Article 10 of the
Model Convention:
The fact that the recipient of a dividend is considered to be the
beneficial owner of that dividend does not mean, however, that
the limitation of tax provided for by paragraph 2 must
automatically be granted. This limitation of tax should not be
granted in cases of abuse of this provision (see also paragraphs
17 and 22 below). As explained in the section on ‘Improper
use of the Convention’ in the Commentary on Article 1, there
are many ways of addressing conduit company and, more
generally, treaty shopping situations. These include specific
anti-abuse provisions in treaties, general anti-abuse rules and
substance-over-form or economic substance approaches. Whilst
the concept of ‘beneficial owner’ deals with some forms of tax
avoidance (i.e. those involving the interposition of a recipient
who is obliged to pass on the dividend to someone else), it does
not deal with other cases of treaty shopping and must not,
therefore, be considered as restricting in any way the
application of other approaches to addressing such cases.
It is noted that the points of view of the OECD
(regarding the concurrence of the PPT on one hand and
the LOB provision and the beneficial ownership provision
on the other hand) as mentioned above are in line with
decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court on applying the
concept of abuse of law (fraus legis) in the domestic
context in situations where the legislator had introduced
detailed anti-abuse legislation. Notwithstanding the
detailed anti-abuse legislation, it turned out to be possible
that situations that fell outside (the verbatim of) the
detailed legislation, could be successfully challenged with
the concept of abuse of law.28
6 CONCLUSION
Introducing the principal purpose test in treaties means
that the concept of ‘fraus conventionis’ is introduced in
treaties. A lot of treaties, of course, do already have a (kind
of) PPT, but the use of a PPT will become more
widespread. Therefore it is important to try to (better)
understand its meaning and practical implications. It
follows from the above that, from the position of the tax
authorities, the subjective test of the PPT is a relatively
‘easy’ test, if one compares it with, e.g., an essential
purpose test or dominant purpose test. The objective test
can provide some relief for taxpayers.
The interpretation of the various elements in the PPT
might not be easy in practice. Although the draft
Commentary on Article X(7) gives examples of the scope
of Article X(7), especially the ‘object and purpose’ test is
not easy to interpret. In this article, an attempt has been
made to develop practical guidance to interpret Article
X(7), based on Dutch case law and doctrine.
Notes
27 Paragraph 4, on page 55 and 56 of the report.
28 Supreme Court 11 Jul. 2008, nr. 43 376, BNB 2008/266, conclusion Advocate-General Wattel and annotation O.C.R. Marres and Supreme Court 1 Jun. 2012, nr. 11/
00009, BNB 2012/213, annotation R.J. de Vries.
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